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SURPRISED BY SIN*: HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND UNIVERSALITY 
Tawia Ansah** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although the frailties of human rights as an ideal or ideology or state 
practice are evident, that ideal has become a part of modern 
consciousness, a lens through which to see the world, a universal 
discourse, a potent rhetoric and aspiration. 1 
International human rights law's claim to universality, at the level 
of normative formation, has been shaped by conceptions of the self over 
time. The metaphysical reconfigurations of the self, from the 
Enlightenment to the present, have marked the human rights narrative in 
particular ways. This essay will suggest that since World War II, a 
conception of the self within a narrative of rights has. been replaced, or 
at least countermanded, by a conception of sacral evil, with profound 
implications for the normative claim to universality of the human rights 
discourse. 
The essay begins with a synoptic analysis of the rise of the claim to 
universality within the international human rights narrative, followed by 
the critique of universalism from the perspective of cultural relativism. 
The essay will then briefly outline the complex and interesting history 
of the rise and fall of the self within the Western metaphysical tradition, 
in order to situate the self in relation to the human rights discourse. At 
the end of that history lies the Holocaust, which begins a new story and 
a new ethical framework for international human rights. I will present 
two stories, one from the period immediately following the Holocaust, 
and the other from the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in order to 
suggest the consequences for the new ethics as an international human 
rights praxis. I conclude with a call for the return to critical analysis, or 
* Title taken from STANLEY FISH, SURPRISED BY SIN: THE READER IN PARADISE LOST 
(2d ed. 1997) (hereinafter FISH). 
** Tawia Ansah, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., Columbia University; LL.B., University of 
Toronto; Assistant Professor; Director, Center for International Law & Policy, New England 
School of Law. My thanks to faculty at New England School of Law for comments and 
criticisms. Thanks also to A. Michael Pierson and Edward J. Baba, both at Syracuse 
University College of Law, for a superb edit of earlier portions of this article and for 
stimulating conversations regarding this article, respectively. 
l. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: 
LAW, POLITICS, MORALS v (2d ed. 2000). 
HeinOnline -- 30 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 308 2003
308 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 30:307 
a cnttque of the juridical-rational self, abandoned by a resurgent 
sacrality of evil at the level of normative formation within the modem 
international human rights movement. 
II. THE UNIVERSALIST-CULTURAL RELATIVIST DEBATE 
What makes anyone, thousands of miles away from the latest 
carnage of a mass human rights violation, morally obligated to respond? 
The strength and the weakness of international human rights law 
reposes in its claim to universality. The claim is contested on two 
levels: one is an external challenge, the other internal. Universalism is 
contested, on the one hand, by the cultural relativists; on the other hand, 
universalism is challenged by a critique internal to the human rights 
movement as a discourse. In the following, I will briefly adumbrate the 
rise of universalism within international law, and its challenge by the 
cultural relativists within the past century. I argue that this "persistent 
theoretical debate" within international law misses the point, because 
the more profound challenge is internal to the normative 
presuppositions of the discourse. 2 
International human rights as a movement proceeds on the 
assumption that its legitimacy "depends upon the existence and 
perspicuousness of fundamental principles of justice that transcend 
culture, society, and politics." Cultural relativists argue that if there are 
no such transcendent principles, no absolute moral values that transcend 
cultures, then international human rights loses its legitimacy. Cultural 
· relativists suggest that norms and values are culturally and politically 
contingent: "all values are socially constructed. On this view, values 
are products of human beings, acting in particular historical and social 
contexts."3 As such, they suggest that the international human rights 
movement, rooted in the Western rationalist tradition, is "imperialistic" 
in its imposition of a particular normative structure on the rest of the 4 . 
world. 
Guyora Binder traces universalism, as a specific claim of 
international human rights, to the need for a response to the state-centric 
focus of international law within the nineteenth century. As Binder puts 
it, international law in the nineteenth century was "a product of the 
2. Guyora Binder, Cultural Relativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law, 
5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211 (1999). 
3. /d.at214. 
4. Id. at 217. See also Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of 
Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT'L L. J. (2001) (arguing that the norms of international human 
rights law are both Western and biased against non-Western cultures and values). 
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consent of sovereign states, whether manifested in treaties or in custom 
and usage. This theory of international law ... securely rooted 
international law's validity in the will of powerful governments - but 
left little place for an international law of human rights that would 
constrain these governments from mistreatin~ their own people or 
persons unprotected by another government." In response, human 
rights advocates "attempted to ground international human rights law on 
a source of authority superior to the state." This source of authority was 
a universally valid moral principle. Essentially, these advocates 
suggested that, "all persons, regardless of culture, citizenship and 
nationality have inherent rights which precede and condition political 
societies and institutions. "6 
The source of human rights, therefore, as inhering in the 
transcultural, trans-historical or "deracinated individual human beings," 
is a particular configuration of the self (or subject) as conceptualized by 
the Enlightenment philosophers. 7 It was therefore open to the charge of 
being culturally specific to that tradition, particularly by those from 
non-western societies.8 Cultural relativists argued that the core 
instruments of international human rights law-the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights-"reflect a liberal individualism prevalent in the 
West, and ignore the importance of group membership, of duties, and of 
respect for nature prevalent in many non-western cultures."9 Cultural 
relativists in the West also maintained that the norms embodied in those 
instruments may be legitimate only inasmuch as they accord with 
political cultures, and not as inhering in the subject as such. '0 
Thus began the protracted theoretical debate between cultural 
relativists and universalists. The latter suggested that the argument 
against universalism is "self-contradictory," since if all values are 
relative, then the value judgment that values are culturally relative 
5. Binder, supra note 2, at 211. 
6. Id. at 212. 
7. Id. at 213. See, e.g., Dragan Milovanovic, The Postmodernist Turn: Lacan, 
Psychoanalytic Semiotics, and the Construction of Subjectivity in Law, 8 EMORY INT. L. 
REV. 67, 68 (1994). "Modernist thought was a direct product of the Enlightenment. 
Modernist thought was characterized by the celebration of: ... the discovery of the individual 
as an autonomous, self-directing, coherent, and unified being (the idea of the centered 
subject expressed best by the idea of cogito ergo sum - 'I think, therefore I am')" (emphasis 
in original). 
8. Binder, supra note 2, at 214. 
9. Id. at 213. 
10. Id. at 214. 
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d . 1 11 B. d . un ercuts its own argument as a per se rue. m er pomts out, 
however, that belief in a particular value "does not entail some 
additional belief about the metaphysical status of the value."12 Binder, 
in any event, resolves the issue pragmatically by suggesting that even if 
the claim to universality is merely that, i.e., a claim, and there does not 
in fact exist any higher metaphysical plane of norms and values that are 
trans-historical, nevertheless the institutions of international human 
rights law are by and large western constructs, imposing norms on 
developing states which, in any event, are neo-colonial and as such also 
western constructs. As such, notwithstanding the charge of 
"imperialism," since there are material benefits to the spread of human 
rights-"building decent and democratic societies in a developing world 
suspended between local and global cultural structures" and 
"progressive social change"-the charge of imperialism should be 
moot: "The problem, in short, is not that human rights standards are too 
imperialistic, but that they are not imperialistic enough."13 
The external challenge to universalism outlined above is quickly 
dispatched when it is evident that whether, on the one hand, there do 
exist a priori rights that inhere in the individual subject, or whether this 
is merely one claim amongst many, nevertheless the language of human 
rights, or its discourse, has, as Alston and Steiner note, "become a part 
of modern consciousness, a lens through which to see the world, a 
universal discourse," even for cultural relativists in opposition to its 
universal claims. 
Michael Ignatieff also notes that human rights, "has become the 
major article of faith of a secular culture that fears it believes in nothing 
else." 14 This brings me to the second, internal critique of the 
universality of human rights. Whereas the first critique was on the 
ethical claim of universality, the second is on the metaphysical 
possibility for universal norms and values as such, or, put another way, 
on the possibility or viability of a metaphysics of human rights. This is 
the attack advanced by post-Enlightenment developments in relation to 
configurations of the individual subject, or the self that, as noted above, 
sits at the core of an understanding of human rights. Whereas the 
external critique may affect the reception or imposition of rights on non-
11. Id. at 214-215. 
12. Binder, supra note 2, at 215. 
13. Id. at 221. Binder also notes, "Imperialism is an intractable rea lity in the global 
state system and no scheme of human rights norms will be effective unless it is 
institutionalized within that imperial system." Id. 
14. Michael Ignatieff, Whose Universal Values? The Crisis in Human Rights , THE 
NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, May 1999, at 58. 
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western states, the internal critique affects the self-perception of the 
discourse, as well as the way we, within the discourse, see the human 
rights event. It also affects how the event is remembered, and the 
consequences for the way we see contingent upon memorialization. 
The internal critique answers the question why, or under what rationale, 
we should feel morally obligated to respond to atrocities far away. I 
will argue that the reconfigurations of the self over time changed the 
universalist rationale, essentially from a metaphysical to an ethical 
conceptualization of the moral act, thereby shaping our response to 
mass human rights violations. 
III. THE SELF AND THE SACRED: CONFIGURATIONS OVER TIME 
On the one hand, there is a similarity between the argument put 
forward by the cultural relativists and the post-Enlightenment critics of 
the metaphysical tradition, sometimes referred to as the 
"postmodernists" to contrast them with the "modernists" that followed 
the Enlightenment: contrary to Plato and the classical philosophers, 
there may be no such thing as trans-historical moral absolutes, no such 
thing as a "world of transcendent, immutable, eternal Forms or 
prototypes."15 Both cultural relativists and postmodernists are skeptical 
of such certainties. Extending the argument of the former to its logical 
conclusion, i.e. that rights do not inhere a priori, in some state of 
"natural law" within the individual (and that the claim that it does is a 
Western construct or fiction), one finds oneself squarely amongst the 
postmodern philosophers, whose argument is that the metaphysical self 
as juridical subject does not reside at the "center" of the discourse, does 
not have "inherent rights" a priori the social, political and cultural 
matrix within which she is situated. In the following I outline, in a 
highly truncated form, this trajectory, and conclude by suggesting that 
the central absence of the rational self is not in fact a vacuum, but rather 
a specific set of postulates and yearnings. 
As noted, the Enlightenment celebrated the individual as a 
"centered subject." Rationalism also maintained the centrality of "the 
juridic subject as an abstract bearer of rights." As Dragan Milovanovic 
notes, "The Enlightenment was a time of optimism."16 It was not long, 
however, before the negative side of the modernist society that followed 
the Enlightenment began to be portrayed. A detailed critique of the rise 
and fall of the centered subject is rather beyond the parameters of this 
15. GILLIAN ROSE, MOURNING BECOMES LAW: PHILOSOPHY AND REPRESENTATION 8 
(1996). 
16. Milovanovic, supra note 7, at 68. 
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essay, but the subject's decline was probably implicit even at its height. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, for instance, showed how the subject in the 
modernist period was already wobbly and not so certain of its centrality: 
the subject now "was weak and sought idols to overcome his or her state 
in being. Semiotic fictions offered salvation. These fictions included 
the idea that individuals are centered subjects (e.g., self-determining 
individuals)." As Milovanovic notes, Nietzsche argued that, "These 
fictions were necessary to overcome the individual's inner sense of loss; 
such fictions created certainty, stability, and predictability."17 Likewise, 
Sigmund Freud altered the notion of the consciously self-determining 
individual, suggesting that, "Most of what accounts for individual 
behavior ... was really unconscious." As such, Freud argued that the 
individual "was more 'determined' than 'determining."'18 At this 
juncture, it may be said that the sovereign subject of the discourse on 
human rights was herself subject to aporia, or gaps in the coherence and 
seamlessness of the selfhood imagined by the Enlightenment 
rationalists. 
The modernist critique of the self nevertheless prepared the way 
for the more thoroughgoing decapitation that followed the Second 
World War. The centered self was seen as the necessary, and 
lubricating, fiction of centralized Rower and domination. The ideal 
"centered self' was an imperialist. 9 Milovanovic locates "the formal 
take-off period of postmodernist thought" in 1960s France, at a time 
when "student unrest and leftist politics dominated all aspects of 
society."20 One tenet of postmodernism was "the belief that stipulating 
'foundational truths' (e.g., positing truth claims for all times and 
settings) that are claimed to be objective and potentially subject to the 
verifyin§ test of the 'neutrality' of the scientific method were 
suspect." 1 Another related tenet was "the idea that the subject was not 
as centered and in control as prevalent ideologfi claimed (in fact, the 
person became seen as the de-centered subject)." 2 
17. Milovanovic, supra note 7, at 69. 
18. Id. 
19. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, ERNESTO LACLAU & s LAVOJ ZIZEK, c ONTINGENCY, 
HEGEMONY, UNIVERSALITY: CONTERMPORARY DIALOGUES ON THE LEFT 15 (2000) ("The 
question of universality has emerged perhaps most critically in those Left discourses which 
have noted the use of the doctrine of universality in the service of colonialism and 
imperialism. The fear, of course, is that what is named as universal is the parochial property 
of dominant culture, and that 'universalizability' is indissociable from imperial 
expansion."). 
20. Milovanovic, supra note 7, at 70. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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Between modernism and postmodemism lies the Second World 
War and, more specifically, the Holocaust. I suggest that those events 
influenced the later articulation of the tenets of postmodemism in 
profound ways. Indeed, the Holocaust evinced the sense of loss that 
gave meaning to the de-centeredness of the subject; alternatively, the 
loss of the rational self found its logical expression in the Trauerarbeit 
of the Holocaust. As Jacques Derrida once famously put it, "I mourn, 
therefore I am," thereby conflating two powerful normative postulates 
of postmodemism: the centrality of the Holocaust, and the conscious 
repudiation of the rationalist "cogito, ergo sum. "23 
Now two things can be said about this centrality of the Holocaust: 
one, how it was seen and interpreted by the contemporary discursive 
practices, including law (and for our purposes international human 
rights law), and in philosophy more generally. The second thing to note 
is how the interpretation in tum affected those discourses, or how it 
entered them in specific ways, thereby enabling a certain way of seeing 
other mass human rights violations. Interpretation and knowledge are 
therefore reciprocal, with direct implications for the normative 
framework of the human rights narrative.24 In the following, I will 
adumbrate these developments, first by suggesting the ways in which 
the Holocaust was interpreted, then by outlining the knowledge, within 
the discursive practice of human rights, thereby produced. In both, it 
will be evident that the centrality of the (metaphysical) self as 
transhistorical bearer of rights, now debunked, haunts the human rights 
narrative, particularly in terms of the claim to universality. 
The configuration of the self and the interpretation of the 
Holocaust are closely implicated. Gillian Rose suggests that the loss of 
the subject in the postmodern moment did not leave a vacuum: "Post-
modemism in its renunciation of reason, power, and truth identifies 
itself as a process of endless mourning, lamenting the loss of securities 
which, on its own argument, were none such."25 What takes the place 
of the subject, or "presence," is both the "desire for presence" and "the 
acceptance of absence."26 This is the characteristic of mourning, quite 
different from the aporetic reading of the subject under Nietzsche's 
analysis. This reading is instead determinative, since the acceptance of 
23. ROSE, supra note 15, at 11. 
24. See, e.g., Barbara Stark, Afler/Word(s): 'Violations of Human Dignity' and 
Postmodern International Law, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 315, 324 (2002) ("Like international 
human rights law, postmodern ism is often linked to the discovery of the death camps after 
World War 11."). 
25. ROSE, supra note 15, at 11. 
26. Id. 
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absence is based on the radical repudiation of presence understood as a 
centralized self, self as arbiter of sovereign, autonomous experience. 
Thus, postmodernism construes the sovereign self in the first 
instance by severing it from its metaphysical foundation. 27 That is, 
there is no longer any room for a rationalist/universalist discourse, 
totally discredited since the Holocaust.28 The decentered self, under this 
schema, is divorced from reality, or autonomous experience. Where, 
that is, "knowledge, power and practical reason are attributed to the 
model of the autonomous, bounded, separated, individual self, the self 
within the city, 'the alliance of logic and politics,"' the analogical de-
centered self, to become ethical and escape the solipsism of absence 
must, in Rose's words, "be devastated, traumatized, unthroned, by the 
commandment to substitute the other for itself."29 This is a form of 
"passivity beyond passivity" argued to define the postmodern self.30 In 
short, the postmodern critique of the rational self discovered in the 
Holocaust, on the one hand, the telos of rationalism, and on the other 
hand, the genesis of a new ethics founded on traumatic experience. 
Traumatic experience in this sense requires that the event itself be read 
deterministically, that is, as a coherent, seamless whole that admits of 
no aporia, no room for political or historical contingency, no 
compromise. This deterministic reading of the event is a form of 
sacralization. 
I suggest that the de-centering' of the subject within the discourse 
on human rights was replaced by the traumatic object of the Holocaust. 
There are two possible reasons that this should have happened. The 
first, and the most obvious reason, is the heightened emotion-and the 
sense of loss-experienced in response to traumatic events. The 
temptation is then to erect not only a collapse of the possibility of 
transcendence-we are more than this carnage, this vulnerability, of 
flesh and bones-but also to rationalize and universalize an "ethics of 
the flesh," in Gary Madison's words, whereby value is inherent in the 
human body as such. 31 The body is in effect fetishized and sacralized, 
27. See, e.g., Gary Madison, The Ethics and Politics of the Flesh , in THE ETHICS OF 
POSTMODERNJTY: CURRENT TRENDS JN CONTINENTAL THOUGHT 181 ( 1999) ("Unlike the 
more deconstructive postmodems who came after him Merleau-Ponty does not deny the 
'principle of universalizability' (to say that a truth-claim is rational means that it is, in 
principle, universalizable), but he does seek to conceptualize it in a nonmetaphysical or 
nonfoundational way."). 
28. ROSE, supra note 15, at 11 ("I resist equally the super-eminence conferred on 'the 
Holocaust' as the logical outcome of Western metaphysical reason ... "). 
29. Id. at 37. 
30. Id. 
31. Madison, supra note 27, at 75 ("[A] full-fledged ethics of the flesh would be a 
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replacing the metaphysical (abstract) self as the projection of 
universalizability. This, Madison suggests, involves an ethics of the 
flesh that is, at base, an ethics of "cruelty limitation. "32 
The second reason for the postmodern turn away from metaphysics 
and toward ethics in the wake of the Holocaust is more philosophical, 
and holds that the modernist critique of rationalism that required the 
rejection of universality (or of the self as repository of inherent, trans-
historical rights) left no ground for a new, post-Holocaust ethics, or no 
metaphysical ground upon which to found a new ethics.33 Ethics 
divorced from metaphysics, as suggested, was characterized as the 
"acceptance" of absence. The trauma of the Holocaust, as apotheosis 
and repudiation of legal-rationality, therefore made it ripe for a kind of 
negative universalism.34 Words to describe the Holocaust, such as 
"incommensurable " "ineffable " "unrepresentable " "the abyss " and 
' ' ' ' 
"radical evil," suggest not only intimations of the sacred, but also the 
transcendent nature of the event.35 This is precisely the project of 
sacralism: to remove the event from experience, to invest it with 
transcendent, ineffable meaning. It is precisely the nature of such a 
project to fill the void created by the now execrated self, its attendant 
"inherent rights," and its claim to universal validity. 
Now, much has been said about the sacralization of the 
Holocaust.36 But what I hope to show in the following is its occurrence 
within the juridical framework at a formative moment within the 
modern human rights movement. That is, I hope to show the link 
rational ethics laying claim to universality." 
32. ROSE, supra note 15, at 6 ("In the place of this metaphysical tradition the 'ere ation 
of self is to be explored independently of any theory of justice, which is thereby restricted 
to the vaporous ethics of 'cruelty' limitation, learnt from modem literature and not from 
analysis or philosophy."). 
33. See, e.g., MARJORIE GARBER ET AL ., T HE TURN TO ETHICS ix (2000) ("The 
decentering of the subject has brought about a recentering of the ethical."). 
34. ROSE, supra note 15, at 27 ("The familiar structure of argument then runs as 
follows: a tight fit is posited between the Holocaust and a general feature of modernity- its 
legal-rationality, its architectural history, the logic of meaning itself. This leads to the 
judgment that the feature in question made the Holocaust possible or realizable."). 
35. See, e.g., id. ("But to name the Nazi genocide 'the Ho! ocaust' is already to over-
unify it and to sacralize it, to see it as providential purpose - for in the Hebrew scriptures, a 
holocaust refers to a burnt sacrifice which is offered in its entirety to God without any part 
of it being consumed") (emphasis in original). 
36. For critical analysis the development within popular culture of the sacral ization of 
Holocaust memory, see, e.g., PETER NOVICK, THE HOLOCAUST IN AMERICAN LIFE (1999). 
For a more scathing and detailed analysis of the deliberate cynical deployment of "the 
Holocaust" to advance vested and political interests, see, NORMAN FINKELSTEIN, THE 
HOLOCAUST INDUSTRY: REFLECTIONS ON THE EXPLOITATION OF JEWISH SUFFERING (2000) 
[hereinafter FINKELSTEIN]. 
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between the claim to universality and the centrality of a sacralized 
Holocaust at this juncture of the human rights narrative. Both 
procedures are forms of legitimation. As Alston and Steiner note, "it 
would be impossible to grasp the character of the human rights 
movement without a knowledge about international law and its 
contributions to it. The movement's aspirations to universal validity are 
necessarily rooted in that body of law."37 It makes sense, therefore, to 
begin a discussion of the discourse's claim to universality in light of the 
critique of the self outlined above by, first of all, seeing how the 
Holocaust received a juridical (and legitimating) sacralization, how this 
process enabled a claim to universal validity, and how the process of 
sacralization affected the narrative of human rights over time. 
So far, I have briefly sketched the beginnings of the universalist 
claim of international human rights and the critique of the existence of 
inherent or trans-historical rights from two perspectives: external, from 
different world cultures, and internal, from within the Western 
metaphysical tradition and its configurations of the self. I have 
suggested that the former problematic is in part resolved if one accepts 
that notwithstanding the imperialism of international human rights, the 
discourse nonetheless is endemic and pervasive. I have suggested that 
the cultural relativist's arguments against universality closely resemble 
the critique of the self within the rationalist narrative, including the 
human rights discourse, in terms of a repudiation of the metaphysical 
tradition that postulates inherent, natural rights that precede specific 
cultural formations. As such, the rejection of that tradition, whether 
advanced by cultural relativists or postmodern theorists, arrives at the 
same place. 
I then argued that the de-centered self left an absence that 
compromised the claim to universality. The critique of centrality left 
the self vulnerable to decapitation when the Holocaust challenged the 
very basis for legal-rational thought. Alternatively, the absence of the 
rational self left the discourse vulnerable to the centrality of the 
Holocaust as traumatic, determinate "absence." To the basic question: 
why should I, thousands of miles away, feel morally obligated to 
respond to the latest mass human rights violation? The normative 
answer posited by a discourse with a subject that no longer roots and 
centers its claim to universal application on the possibility of inherent 
rights for all persons, but rather roots its legitimacy in the imponderable 
existence of evil in the world, and on its discursive-juridical triumph 
over evil, results in two conflicting projections. 
37. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 1, at v. 
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On the one hand, the abandonment of a rational quest for 
transcendent moral values, replaced by the installation (sacralization) of 
"ultimate evil" as the sole transcendent truth, and as the measure of 
universal validity ("I don't know whether you have 'rights' since they 
are culturally contingent, but if you commit genocide you have gone 
beyond the pale"), enervates the promulgation of human rights as 
globally applicable, desirable and legitimate. It also compromises a 
sense of human worth and dignity. We are measured by a negative 
limit, and we are not seen unless we approach that limit. On the other 
hand, because the ethical response is consciously post-metaphysical, its 
moral appeal is largely emotional, and as such the limit case as 
paradigmatic evil precludes or diminishes analysis of "lesser" human 
rights violations. It also suppresses analysis as such, since the category 
of ultimacy precludes intersubjective critical engagement. That is, the 
inscription of ultimate evil as the source or legitimacy of the juridical 
narrative bars the legal-rational apprehension and critique of the event. 
In effect, the event is seen less as factual history and more as the sudden 
irruption of sin, with its accreted sense of ineffability, trans-historicity, 
and loss. We are always and already surprised by its existence in the 
world. And by suppressing critical analysis, or what I will refer to as 
contextual relativization, we deflect its complicit and teleological 
implications. 
IV. SACRAL EVIL AND THE FORMATION OF 
A NEW ETHICAL FRAMEWORK 
It has been suggested that three things occurred after World War II 
in terms of the narrative of human rights: the sacralization of the 
Holocaust, the critique of rationalism under a new ethics, and the 
replacement of the self, reconfigured as "de-centered," with a 
centralization of "radical evil" as the basis or the argument for an 
extension of the universal moral obligation. 
The following two stories, drawn first from Nuremberg and then 
from Bosnia, are offered to explicate the following points about the 
claim to universality as validating or legitimizing international human 
rights. The first story shows how a juridical-sacral template is created 
in relation to the Holocaust. In this story of a Nuremberg trial, I will 
show two things: (1) how a deterministic reading of the event at trial 
(the Holocaust) locates meaning solely in the event itself which, in tum, 
objectifies the parties, or creates archetypes: monsters and saviors; and 
(2) I hope to show how this response to mass atrocity sets a normative 
framework for the juridical apprehension (narration) of the event. That 
is, it inaugurates an ethics of refusal, and as such the claim to universal 
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validity is no longer invested in positive or objective rights, but rather 
as a limit, in opposition to evil. The second story suggests the 
entrenchment of this procedure when the human rights movement is 
confronted with another mass human rights violation in Europe. The 
story is offered to suggest the unfolding of this juridical framework after 
the Cold War: the archetypes are. implied in the highly schematized 
division of the belligerents in the Bosnian conflict, so much so that the 
elision of politics implies an absence of agents, an almost literal 
iteration of the "absent subject" of postmodemity. 
Kahn notes that, "The international-law scholar claims that the 
legal prohibition on genocide is at the foundation of the modem 
international legal order." This is because "It is the paradigm of a }us 
cogens norm and thus intimately bound up with the belief in progress." 
As such, "Imagining rights may be an essential step in constructing the 
meaning of certain forms of violence."38 The new ethics, I suggest, 
imagines rights in relation to the limit case. 
One of the lesser cases at Nurember~ was the so-called "Justice 
Trial," so named because Josef AltstOtter, the named defendant, and 
most of the other fifteen accused, were trained lawyers, and all worked 
within the judicial system of the Third Reich. The trial took place in 
March, 194 7. Two of the defendants, Ernst Lautz (Chief Public 
Prosecutor at the People's Court in Berlin), and Oswald Rothaug 
(Director f the District Court in Nuremberg, later Public Prosecutor at 
the People's Court) were convicted of "the crime against humanity of 
genocide.',4° At the time, genocide did not exist sensu stricto as a crime 
in any statutory or positive law; it came into existence with the 
ratification of the Genocide Convention the following year.41 As such, 
38. PAUL W. KAHN, T HE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP 111 (1999). 
39. Opening Statement for the United States of America , United States v. Alstotter et 
al., Military Tibunal No. III, Case No. 3, Mar. 5, 1947 [hereinafter Alstotter]. See also, 
LIPPMAN, III TRAILS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10954 (1951) [hereinafter JUSTICE JUDGMENT]. The 
defendant's name is alternatively spelled Altstotter, Alstotter, Altstoetter, and Alstoetter. 
The named defedant was Civil Law & Prcedure Division Chief of the Reich Ministry of 
Justice, and Oberfuhrer in the SS (Die Schutzstaffeln der National Socialistishchen 
Arbei terpartei). 
40. JUSTICE JUDGMENT, supra note 39, at 995 (supervision of the enforcement of the 
discriminatory law [Enabling Act] against Poles and Jews of December 4, 1941). 
41. The definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention, Article II, reads as follows: 
" ... any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
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it is interesting to see how the crime is figured in the trial transcripts in 
its moral, legal and political dimensions. 
To circumvent the imputation that conviction was based on ex post 
facto (new) law, the Nuremberg tribunal states that "the pressure of 
public opinion," among other things, has led to the "international 
recognition that certain crimes against humanity committed by Nazi 
authority against German nationals constituted violations not alone of 
statute but also of common international law."42 The tribunal went on 
to note that "whether [the atrocities charged as genocide] constitute 
technical violations of laws and customs of war. .. [they] were acts of 
such scope and malevolence ... [and] so clearly imperiled the peace of 
the world that the1 must be deemed to have become violations of 
international law."4 Finally, in the absence of a statute on genocide, 
the tribunal invokes the recent resolution passed by the United Nations 
in condemnation of "the crime of genocide," stating that "The General 
Assembly [is] the most authoritative organ [in the] interpretation of 
world opinion," conceding, however, that as a political (rather than a 
legislative) body, "Its [i.e. the General Assembly's] recognition of 
genocide as an international crime is persuasive evidence of the fact," 
but not dispositive.44 The Convention did not pass into law until five 
years later, in 1951. Thus, albeit with trepidation, the tribunal set aside 
the question whether there was a "law" as such proscribing the "crime 
against humanity of genocide."45 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions oflife calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group." 
Convention On The Prevention And Punishment Of The Crime Of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 
78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
42. JUSTICE JUDGMENT, supra note 39, at 982. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 983; See also, U.N. (A/C.6/84), 22nd Meeting, 22 November, 1946, Mr. 
Dihigo (Cuba), referring to Resolution 96 (I), "acknowledged that the General Assembly 
was not a legislative body and that its recommendations could not be considered as laws, but 
felt nevertheless that any measure taken by the General Assembly was vested with 
incontestable authority," at 101. See also, e.g., Proceedings of the Sixth Committee, U.N. 
GAOR, 6th Comm., 3d Sess, 63d-135th mtgs., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.63-A/C.6/SR.135 
(1948) (hereinafter Sixth Committee Proceedings), Mr. Kaeckenbeeck (Belgium) during the 
65th meeting (Paris, October 2, 1948), who notes that, "Resolution 96(1) of the Assembly 
was of a declaratory character; it specified what the Assembly considered to be the law, but 
it did not create law," at 22. See also G.A. Res. 96 (I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., at 189, U.N. 
Doc. A/64/ Add. I (1946); the General Assembly later reaffirmed that genocide was an 
international crime in G.A. Res. 180 (II), U.N. GAOR, 2nd Sess., at 129-130, U.N. Doc. 
A/519 (1947). 
45. JUSTICE JUDGMENT, supra note 39, at 983. 
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The tribunal recognizes that it has recused itself from law and 
entered the realm of moral judgment, punishing the defendants "by 
analogy" to crimes of war. Indeed, the prosecution, in its opening 
statements regarding the jurisdiction of the tribunal to try the war 
criminals notes that its original authority, derived from the series of 
Allied declarations during and after the war, was designed not to put the 
criminals on trial (due process) but to "punish" them according to the 
consensus of the Allied powers.46 And even though jurisdiction is later 
obtained through the formulation of statutory law, this initial perceived 
"taint" of law as, rather than beyond, politics, remained to haunt the 
proceedings at trial.47 The resort to "universal moral judgment," 
therefore, suggests the attempt to suture this inherent problematic at the 
heart of the creation of legal (human rights) norms.48 
The law's temporal and normative framework begins, then, slightly 
off-balance: this is not stare decisis, but rather, law ex post facto. As if 
to underline further the escape from the historicity of the event, the 
rhetoric invoked by both prosecution and defense counsel is invested 
with moral condemnations and sacral associations. The prosecution 
concludes its opening remarks with the following statement: 
In summary the defendants are charged with judicial murder and other 
atrocities which they committed by destroying law and justice in 
Germany, and by then utilizing the emptied forms of legal process for 
prosecution, enslavement, and extermination on a vast scale .. .I have 
said that the defendants know, or should know, that a court is the 
House of Law. But it is, I fear, many years since any of the 
defendants have dwelt therein. Great as was their crime against those 
who died and suffered at their hands, their crime against Germany was 
46. The prosecution's opening statements trace the tribunal's authority to the Moscow 
Declaration, which holds "in relevant part: 'The above declaration is without prejudice to 
the case of the major criminals, whose offenses have no particular geographical localization 
and who will be punished by the joint decision of the governments of the Allies."' The 
Prosecution notes that the criminals are "to be 'punished,' not necessarily tried, by 'joint 
decision,' not necessarily a joint or international tribunal, of the Allies. The basic policy is 
thus clearly laid down"; Altstotter, supra note 38, at 33, cited to the Moscow Declaration 
(Stalin, Roosevelt, Churchill), October 30, 1943, later affirmed (with France) in Potsdam, 
August 2, 1945 and London, August 8, 1945 (latter also created the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg). The Allies ratified the Law 10 of the Control 
Council for Germany on December 20, 1945. On October 18, 1946, the "Ordnance No. 7, 
concerning the Organization and Powers of Certain Military Tribunals," created the present 
American tribunal, known as Military Tribunal No. III. 
47. Control Council Law No. 10. Prosecution attempts to sever relationship to political 
origin of law: "We try them in an international court for crimes under international law 
which finds its authority not in power or force, but in the universal moral judgment of 
mankind"; Altstotter, supra note 39;at 39. 
48. Altstotter, supra note 39, at 39. 
HeinOnline -- 30 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 321 2003
2003) Human Rights And Universality 
even more shameful. They defiled the German temple of justice, and 
delivered Germany into the dictatorship of the Third Reich, "with all 
its methods of terror, and its cynical and open denial of the rule of 
49 law." The temple must be reconstructed ... 
321 
In effect, the temple rehabilitates the law as an ancient, hallowed, 
even sacred, space. This is the ideal, the fantasy, of law's time and 
trajectory. Fantasy notwithstanding, the stakes are high: as Kahn notes, 
"A failure to maintain law appears not as a return to nature, but as a loss 
of divine meaning and thus a state of sin."50 The American prosecutors, 
however, are only too aware of the more sullied reality of law's moral 
and political compromise and complicity within the real world. In their 
quest to prove judicial murder, the prosecution cites to U.S. case law to 
the effect that "the intention to commit genocide" (described as a "plan 
of extermination") may be proven by the commission of acts and the 
conspiracy to commit acts comprising crimes against humanity. The 
case in question involves the Indiana branch of the Ku Klux Klan: 
The case from which we quote arose out of the activities of the Ku 
Klux Klan during the height of its powers in Indiana. The people of 
the United States, on that occasion, at least, had enough courage and 
foresight not to let that organization acquire the control of all its 
judicial system, the way the people of Germany let these defendants 
and their fellow Nazis acquire control of and pervert theirs. 
Consequently, our incipient Nazis were tried. The court in the cited 
case held that the proof of the doing of the overt act, was in itself 
evidence of the intent of the conspirators to commit the act so as to 
establish their intent to conspire.51 
Conspiracy, as the content of the crime of genocide, also informed the 
same charge leveled against the United States government in 1951, the 
year the Genocide Convention came into law, by a group of black 
American professionals (including W.E.B. DuBois and Paul Robeson) 
who called themselves the Civil Rights Congress.52 This group filed a 
49. Id. at I. (In Stanley Kramer's film, Judgment at Nure mberg (1961), which is 
loosely based on the Justice case (one of the four defendants is called Hofstetter, and all of 
them are former judges under the Reich Ministry), the prosecutor says in opening 
statements, "[These were] crimes committed in the name of the law ... The defendants 
should have known that the courtroom is not just a court. It is a process and a spirit. It is a 
house of law." Then, it is defense counsel who says, "[This trial] is dedicated to the 
reconsecration of the temple of justice."). 
50. KAHN, supra note 50, at 47-48. 
51. Altst6tter, supra note 39, at 44, 83-84 (citing United States v. Holt, 108 F.2d 365 
(7th Cir. 1935)). 
52. CIVIL RIGHTS CONGRESS, WE CHARGE GENOCIDE: THE HISTORIC PETITION TO THE 
UNITED NATIONS FOR RELIEF FROM A CRIME OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGAINST 
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petition with the United Nations alleging that the US was committing 
"genocide [against] the Negro People." It is a graphic document, with 
pictures of lynchings in the South and vignettes described as "new acts 
of genocide." A couple of examples follow: 
A Florida Sheriff, Willis V. McCall, killed SAMUEL SHEPHERD 
and wounded WALTER LEE IRVIN, 23-year-old Negro prisoners 
whom he was driving to a re-trial which would have proven 
conclusively their innocence of a false "rape" charge. Neither federal 
government nor Florida officials have acted to punish Sheriff McCall 
for this cold-blooded murder. 
* * * 
In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, forty police officers killed an unarmed 
21-year-old Negro youth, JOSEPH AUSTIN CONWAY, allegedly 
being sought for questioning in a robbery. He died in a hail of police 
bullets while seeking to draw fire away from his family and 
. hb 53 ne1g ors. 
The petitioners begin their deposition thus: 
Out of the inhuman black ghettos of American cities, out of the cotton 
plantations of the South, comes this record of mass slayings on the 
basis of race, of lives deliberately warped and distorted by the willful 
creation of conditions making for premature death, poverty and 
disease. It is a record that calls aloud for condemnation, for an end to 
these terrible injustices that constitute a daily and ever-increasing 
violation of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 54 
The petitioners suggest that their deposition is "historic" and 
"necessary:" "We speak of progressive mankind because a policy of 
discrimination at home must inevitably create racist commodities for 
export abroad - must inevitably tend toward war." Furthermore, 
referring to the Nuremberg prosecution's opening speech (i.e. the trial 
of the major war criminals), the CRC notes: "Every word he [Robert H. 
Jackson] voiced against the monstrous Nazi beast applies with equal 
weight, we believe, to those who are guilty of the crimes herein set 
forth." As such, the petitioners "have scrupulously kept within the 
purview" of the Genocide Convention, "held to embrace those 'acts 
committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical 
[sic], racial or religious group as such."' In effect, the CRC alleges 
THE NEGRO PEOPLE (Civil Rights Congress 1951) [hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS CONGRESS]. 
53. CIVIL RIGHTS CONGRESS, supra note 52, at x (prefatory page). 
54. Id. at xi. 
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"mass murder on the score of 'race' ... sanctioned by law." The rhetoric 
evokes similar language employed by the prosecutors in the Alstotter 
case. 
The CRC deposition is interesting for a number of reasons. For 
one thing, it highlights the extent to which the term "genocide" is 
quickly adopted within the discourse concerning human rights 
violations (both international and domestic) to draw attention both to 
the victim of violation and to the nature of the alleged perpetrator's 
actions Uuridical murder, murder by and of law). Just as "crimes 
against humanity" was, for the tribunal judges, an insufficient moniker 
to characterize and condemn the events for which the defendants in 
Alstotter were charged and convicted, even if it meant resorting to a 
term and a figuration beyond law, so also violation at home is 
heightened, and the rhetorical charge intensified, by association with the 
foundational trauma. The CRC resorted to a kind of relativizing of the 
trauma as a political tool, but they were not the only ones: the 
prosecution also could only barely escape relativization between their 
own "House of Law" and the defilement of law by the Germans. They 
resist a moral parity first by signaling the close escape: "on that 
occasion, at least," in reference to the Indiana case, reason and law 
triumphed over passion and politics. They then escape by erecting a 
"temple of justice" between themselves and the Germans' "ideological 
law." In effect, the prosecution escapes from the trial as embedded 
within "political time" through the moral/sacral palimpsest. I suggest 
that this begins the juridical process of sacralization of the event. 
A second characteristic may be observed, as suggested by this 
interaction between the CRC deposition and the Nuremberg transcript: 
to the extent that legal-juridical analysis is reconstructed (or re-
consecrated) by a sacral view of the event through a suppression of 
political contingency, a different construction of the observed object 
comes into view. Essentially, the observer and the observed are 
radically severed. There is no possibility for the intersubjective 
knowledge as between objects, or to affirm a politics of reciprocity. 
The distance between the Germans and the Americans is a sacralized 
opposition between demonic reason (or anti-reason) and the law as an 
ethics of refusal, a refusal to analyze and, as such, to relativize. The 
view of Auschwitz as the "end-product and telos of modem rationality" 
suggests a legal post-rationalist ethics that-has no other foundation but 
its refusal of evil.55 No discourse is possible between objects on 
different sides of the divide. The escape from relativism, therefore, will 
55. ROSE, supra note 15, at 34. 
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engender a way of being in the world, a world radically split between 
good and evil. 
Take one more example, this time from the German perspective. 
Counsel for the accused noted, in response to the alleged destruction of 
law (anti-reason), that on the contrary, during the Third Reich, law was 
vindicated not, however, as a doctrinal corpus that required selfless 
genuflection regardless of material and spiritual exigencies, but rather in 
the form of reified ideology, a new and higher law, transcending mere 
positive law. To the German judiciary under the Third Reich, the 
message repeated time and again was of the insufficiency of positive or 
formal law and the necessity to obtain, well, a temple of justice of sorts, 
an aesthetic ideal of purity of the race/nation that recalls, at one register, 
the purgative haunt of Jim Crow. But the Nazi regime needed formal 
law to achieve its pure destiny, just as the CRC alleges the necessity of 
law to lubricate the wheels of race destruction.56 
The prosecution concedes, in fact, that as things became more 
difficult for the Germans during the war they produced more, not less, 
conventional law.57 From the American perspective, the elevation of 
ideology to law, a flagrant conurbation of law and politics, is anathema 
to a moral schema. From the German perspective, it is precisely a 
moral principle that justifies the movement from politics as source of 
law to politics as law. The State is defined by the desire for fixed 
identity boundaries. That is, the higher law is in effect "the people's 
law," law reconceived as the will or desire for purified sovereign 
identity. And purity, as Joseph Goebbels puts it, requires the highest 
expediency, even if this leads to injustice: 
During a war it is not so much a matter of whether a judgment was 
just or unjust but only whether the decision is expedient. The state 
must protect itself in the most efficient way and wipe them out 
entirely ... One must not proceed from the law, but from the resolution 
56. One might even say race construction. See, e.g., MICHAELS, WALTER BENN, THE 
SOULS OF WHITE FOLK, in LITERATURE AND THE BODY: ESSAYS ON POPULATIONS AND 
PERSONS 192 (1988) (who suggests that through history, constitutional interpretation and the 
case law (e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 540-52 (1896)), American jurisprudence has 
constructed an American race: "[I]nsofar as the question, Are you white? has been and 
continues to be successfully replaced by the question, Are you American? - insofar, that is, 
as a question supposedly about biology has been preserved as a question supposedly about 
national identity - one might say that the very idea of American citizenship is a racial and 
even racist idea, racist not because it embodies a (more or less concealed) preference for 
white skins but because it confers on national identity something like the ontology of 
race."). 
57. Altstotter, supra note 39, at 48. ("But the war also brought about a mass of new 
criminal legislation within Germany. This new legislation was influenced by the necessities 
of war, but also contained mature concepts of National Socialist criminal policy."). 
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that the man must be wiped out. 58 
One suspects that the "man" in question is not just the criminal or the 
deviant, but the individual per s e. Such a movement from the 
individual to the state, a "far-reaching revolution in domestic and 
foreign policies,"59 is difficult and bloody: Rothenberger, one of the 
defendants at bar, once phrased the issue, in a paper on judicial reform 
(before Hitler elevated him to high office in the judiciary), in surgical 
terms: 
The present crisis in the administration of justice today is close to such 
a climax. A totally new conception of the administration of justice 
must be created, particularly a National Socialist judiciary, and for this 
the druggist's salve is not sufficient; only the knife of the surgeon, as 
will later be shown, can bring about the solution. 60 
If the implication of the argument here is the relativization of evil, 
then it is merely in order to return us, as it were, to a critical reflection 
at the borderline that severs us from politically active and engaged 
interaction with the other side. We are absolved from this task-we are 
exempted from political analysis by the "bar" of an emotional 
response-when we sacralize the event, particularly when that event sits 
at the fulcrum of the human rights movement. But absolution is 
precisely the felt need of an eschatological ethics of refusal, which is 
supposed to have saved us from just such a reflection at the border. 
And although it may be contended that justice requires distinctions and 
creates hierarchies of criminality both at the domestic and at the 
international level, the hierarchy posited by the adjudication and 
deployment of genocide as ultimate and sacral embeds the event not in 
legal or historically contested time, where we see the equal investment 
and rage of self and other, but in trans-historical time. 
In the result, figuring law as an ancient temple in need of 
reconstruction, law memorializes the event (the Holocaust) as the sacred 
ground from which was to spring the normative claim to universal 
validity. We see mass human rights violations within the world under 
the category of ultimacy. As such, and divorced from (historical) 
reality, we are surprised by evil as an ontological absence of the self and 
its complicities.61 In the following story, I wish to explore the extent to 
58. Id. at 46 (cited to Speech before the Members of the People's Court, 22 July, 1942). 
59. Altstotter, supra note 39, at 498. 
60. Altstotter, supra note 39, at 498. 
61. "Absence" as the foundation of an ethical framework can be compared with the 
solipsism of "desire," as in the following formulation by Madison, following Merleau-
Ponty, on the ethics of the flesh: " ... consciousness is the desire of the desire of another 
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which this normative structure still operates to immure us within, I 
suggest, our innocence before transgression. 
V. SACRAL PALIMPSEST: THE NON-AGENTIAL SUBJECT 
IN THE CASE OF BOSNIA 
When the UN prosecutors opened the Bosnia and Croatia phase of 
Slobodan Milosevi_'s trial with the charge of genocide, Milosevi_ 
dismissed the charges, 61 in all, arguing that the Serbs were simply 
defending themselves within the context of a civil war: "I invested all 
my power in achieving peace. Serbia and myself deserve recognition 
for working for peace in the area and not being a protagonist of war," he 
said.62 The prosecutor, Geoffrey Nice, replied: "[t]he systematic and 
organized way in which attacks against non-Serb civilian populations in 
Croatia were carried out revealed a carefully designed scheme and 
strategy within an overall plan that may be laid at the door of this 
accused. "63 
What may be equally interesting, however, is the reportage of the 
trial, as concerning "Europe's worst human rights violations since 
World War II," and "the biggest international war crimes trial in Europe 
since Hitler's henchmen were tried at Nuremberg."64 References and 
comparisons to epochal historical events and traumas are of course 
inevitable. What may be less self-evident is how these references 
operate on temporal memory and, as such, shape our responses to 
atrocity. 
The political and moral capture of specific memory toward a 
narrative of the event that will articulate, for all time, the historical 
record is, of course, nothing new. But what I have attempted to explore 
is the law's method of capture when the context is a massive human 
rights violation, mass death. Confronted once again with 
incommensurable evil, the question is: will the law's response once 
more take an elliptical, archetypal form regarding the story of the other, 
similar to the Alstotter case? How, in other words, will Bosnia be 
consciousness. This is exactly what the reversibility of the flesh means; already in the 
depths of the sensible, our being is communication." Madison, supra note 27, at 179. 
Because I see a parity between absence and desire in the repudiation of the metaphysical 
self, I disagree with Madison that his formulation is a Hegelian "ethics of reciprocity or an 
ethics of recognition," since its theoretical basis is too jejune to adjudicate between different 
corporeal speech acts (one person's pain is another's martyrdom, etc.): Id. at 178. 
62. Reuters, Prosecutors Open Genocide Case Against Milosevic , N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
26, 2002, available at: http://www.genocidewatch.org/milosevicgenocide.htm (last visited 
March. 20, 2003). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
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"remembered" in light of the comparisons to the Holocaust? I argue 
that the category of ultimacy outlined above affects the way Bosnia, or 
any other large-scale atrocity, is memorialized by the discourse. We do 
not make references to the Holocaust lightly. Its centripetal force 
within the human rights discourse means that we are always surprised 
by evil, permitting, as noted, a deflection of our own rage and 
investment. In the following story, then, we move from radical evil as 
the rational/universal limit case, creating discursive archetypes at the 
borderline of sin, to a postmodern story of conflict in which the 
archetypal narrative is so implicit and entrenched that we take the 
absence of politics, and of the agential subject, for granted. 
Notwithstanding various attempts in the intervening years, or since 
World War II, to distinguish "genocide" from "the Holocaust," the 
incipient link, and the sense of ultimacy that the linkage accrued, was 
embedded within the normative and prohibitory formation. 65 As such, 
when faced with the first post-Cold War mass atrocity in Europe, it was 
not surprising that not only would the term genocide be deployed, but 
that the meaning of the Holocaust should characterize and underwrite 
the juridical apprehension of the event. 
But the legal instrument, i.e. the Genocide Convention of 1948 
was, by itself, insufficient to characterize the crimes committed in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina as genocide. The violence there both exceeded the 
specific legal parameters - the physical, psychological, economic 
damage - even as the criminality as such did not reach or conform to 
the elements of the legal instruments. What to do? This is how the 
Commission of Experts, empanelled by the United Nations in 1993 to 
investigate war crimes and collect evidence for the yet-to-be-constituted 
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, set about fitting the 
definition of genocide to the events still unfolding before the world in 
the winter of 1993.66 I suggest that the need to characterize the events 
65. See, e.g., David Rieff, An Age of Genocide, THE NEW REPUBLIC, January 29, 1996, 
at 35-36 (arguing that time should have sundered the relationship between the Holocaust 
and genocide but, as a result of the centrality of the extermination of the Jews, "the 
Holocaust may have come not only to define the issue, but also to confuse it. .. And in this 
way the Holocaust may be used to exonerate many crimes and many criminals." NOVICK, 
supra note 36, at 14 (" ... but making it [the Holocaust] the benchmark of oppression and 
atrocity ... trivializes crimes of lesser magnitude. It does this not just in principle, but in 
practice. American debate on the bloody Bosnia conflict of the 1990s focused on whether 
what was going on was 'truly holocaust or merely genocidal;' 'truly genocidal or merely 
atrocious.'"). 
66. Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 780 (1992J, UN S/1994/674 [hereinafter Final Report). S.C. Res. 827, 
U.N. SCOR, 4glh Sess. 3217 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (1993) (The Security Council 
established the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
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as genocide reflected the same concern - how do we see and remember 
a massive and violent event? - as that which informed the subjects in 
the above story: the need to construct the object as separate from the 
subject by a border of innocence. In the result, Bosnia, in its complexly 
violent historical particularity, was placed under erasure. 
The three elements of the Convention definition that the 
Commission had to address were the definition of protected group, the 
meaning of intent, and the jurisdiction of the crimes. The intent 
requirement in the Convention is generally understood to mean 
"specific intent," but Cherif Bassiouni, who headed the Commission 
and later wrote a treatise on the Yugoslav Tribunal's statute, suggested 
that this requirement is "too rigid."67 Stressing that the law is. 
"evolutionary," Bassiouni and the Commissioners suggest that the 
provisions of the Convention be interpreted "in a spirit consistent with 
its purposes."68 In his treatise, Bassiouni characterized the intent 
requirement as follows: 
In most countries, penal codes do not regard motives, rather only 
intent, as the subjective or mental constituent element of a crime. 
Motive and intent may be closely linked, but motive is not mentioned 
in the Convention. The necessary element of intent may be inferred 
from sufficient facts. In certain cases, there will be evidence of 
actions or omissions of such a degree that the defendant may 
reasonably be assumed to have been aware of the consequences of his 
or her conduct, which goes to the establishment of intent, but not 
·1 . 69 necessan y motive. 
The Commissioners' Final Report likewise shifts the emphasis from the 
mens rea, or mental element, to the physical or material element of the 
crime, i.e. sufficient facts, rather than persuasive or corroborative 
evidence of a specific intent, will be dispositive, or will determine 
whether the crime at issue has been committed. 70 Motive, which 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991 in Security Council Resolution 827. The Statute was also adopted 
by the same resolution on May 25, 1993.). 
67. M. C HERIF BASSIOUNI & P ETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 531 (l 996). 
68. Id. at 523 ("As emphasized in the preamble to the Convention, genocide has marred 
all periods of history, and it is this tragic recognition that gives the concept its historical 
evolutionary nature."). Final Report, supra note 66, at 25 para. 94. 
69. BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 67, at 524. 
70. Final Report, supra note 66, at 71 para. 314 ("Knowledge of these grave breaches 
and violations of humanitarian law can reasonably be inferred from consistent and repeated 
practices."). 
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Bassiouni also calls "ultimate aim or purpose," becomes irrelevant.71 
Thus, the argument is that it is irrelevant whether, say, the Bosnian 
Serbs' aim or purpose (political objective) is to claim territory or to 
exterminate a group as such. The commission of acts of violence 
suffices to characterize the nature of the events either as war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, genocide, and so on. 
Bassiouni and the experts move on two grounds for a shift or 
expansion of the legal concept of genocide: what is inscribed in 
domestic penal codes, and what is understood as the "purpose" of the 
Convention of 1948. In a sense, the specific provisions of the 
Convention are circumvented and replaced by those found in penal 
codes to arrive at the Convention's purpose, which is characterized as 
evolutionary, fluid and changing: as the penal codes of municipal law 
change, they reflect the evolution in the purpose of the Convention. But 
purpose, understood in these evolving terms, becomes both the central 
trope of the law and its irrelevance. That is, under this evolutionary 
interpretation of the Convention provisions, legal purpose irradiates 
outward, overshadowing the purpose or aims of the actors themselves. 
But at the center of this central trope are the dispositive acts of the 
perpetrator, standing on their own. 
In effect, the Commission escapes the rigidity of the written 
provisions - which it severs from the underwriting purpose of the 
provisions, which purpose having been released from the written 
document is then filled in, interpreted, according to the writings (penal 
codes) of states parties (the international community) - with a new form 
of rigidity, for once the acts become virtually the sole determinative 
criteria, the legal perspective here gets locked into a specific vignette, a 
narrative that dictates what the purpose of the law and, by subsumption, 
of the others (perpetrator and victim) will be. I will attempt to clarify 
these points in the following. 
First, the Commission defines what the Convention really means 
by "protected group." Beginning with the proviso that genocide is the 
intent to destroy a group "in whole or in part," the Commission then 
goes on to note that, "If essentially the total leadership of a group is 
targeted, it could also amount to genocide," that is, "the totality per se 
may be a strong indication of genocide regardless of the actual numbers 
killed. A corroborating argument will be the fate of the rest of the 
group."72 The Commission then determines that "group" may in fact 
consist of several groups or collectivities: 
71. BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 67, at 524-25. 
72. Final Report, supra note 66, at 25 para. 93-94. 
HeinOnline -- 30 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 330 2003
330 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 30:307 
If there are several or more than one victim groups, and each group as 
such is protected, it may be within the spirit and purpose of the 
Convention to consider all the victim groups as a larger entity. The 
case being, for example, that there is evidence that group A wants to 
destroy in whole or in part groups B, C and D, or rather everyone who 
does not belong to the national, ethnic, racial or religious group A. In 
a sense, group A has defined a pluralistic non-A group using national, 
ethnic, racial and religious criteria for the definition. It seems relevant 
to analyse the fate of the non-Ajjroup along similar lines as ifthe non-
A group had been homogenous. 
The report thus incorporates the perspective - the purpose - of group A 
within the "spirit and purpose" of the law: 
Genocide, an "odious scourge" which the Convention intends "to 
liberate mankind from" (preamble), would as a legal concept be a 
weak or even useless instrument if the overall circumstances of mixed 
groups were not covered. The core of this reasoning is that in one-
against-everyone-else cases the question of a significant number or a 
significant section of the group must be answered with reference to all 
·- .. M the target groups as a larger whole. 
Bassiouni, in his later treatise, goes further in defining "group" for the 
purposes of the Genocide Convention in terms of geography: 
One could also define the group as all Muslims in a given area of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, such as Prijedor, ifthe intent of the perpetrator is 
the elimination of that narrower group ... it may be possible to 
consider the inhabitants of a given area irrespective of their religion as 
part of the entire group, as well as an identifiable group on its own, 
protected in either case by the Genocide Convention as incorporated in 
article 4 of the [Hague Tribunal] Statute. For example, all Bosnians in 
Sarajevo, irrespective of ethnicity or religion, could constitute a 
d . 75 protecte group. · 
Turning to the question of the acts involved as central to 
understanding the purpose of the law, the Commission notes, quoting 
from its earlier interim report, that "' [t]he expression, "ethnic 
cleansing," is relatively new,"' defining it as "'rendering an area 
ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove 
persons of a given group from the area. "'76 The acts that describe ethnic 
73. Id. at 25-26 para. 96. 
74. Id. at 25-26 para. 96. 
75. BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 67, at 531 (citing to the Statute for the 
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia). 
76. Final Report, supra note 66, at 33 para. 129 (citing "First Interim Report," UN 
S/25274, para. 55). 
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cleansing as the "policy and practices conducted in the former 
Yugoslavia ... by means of murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and 
detention," and so on, "could also fall within the meaning of the 
Genocide Convention." 77 
The report distinguishes between ethnic cleansing as simply 
"contrary to international law" and ethnic cleansing as genocide: the 
latter is a matter of policy: "With respect to the practices by Serbs in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, 'ethnic cleansing' is commonly 
used as a term to describe a policy conducted in furtherance of political 
doctrines relating to 'Greater Serbia. "'78 As such, the object and 
purpose of the legal perspective-the task of the experts-is in 
determining that the Serbs, "group A," undertook to ethnically cleanse 
conquered territory during the conflict, whereas the "non-A group" did 
not, or alternatively, that it is only group A which exercises a political 
doctrine relative to a "greater" nation state: 
Ethnic cleansing practices committed by Bosnian Croats with support 
from the Republic of Croatia against Bosnian Muslims in Herzegovina 
are politically related. Furthermore, Croatian forces also engage in 
these practices against Serbs in the Krajina area and in eastern and 
western Slavonia. The violence committed against Serbs in these 
areas appears, however, to have the more defined political aim of 
removing them from the areas.79 
The Commission then catalogues some of the military and 
paramilitary actions taken by the Croatian government or with its 
support to remove "non-A group" (non-Croat) members from Croatian 
territory, noting en passant that, "Similar practices were also, on 
occasion, carried out by Croats [from Croatia] against Muslims in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina." The Commission concludes, however, that 
"the Croatian authorities have publicly deplored these practices and 
sought to stop them, thereby indicating that it is not part of the 
Government's policy."80 . 
There appear to be a few small anomalies in this rendition of the 
conflict. For instance, the term "ethnic cleansing," rather than being 
new and per se redolent of Serbian policy as such, may have been used 
during the Second World War by different parties. In other words, the 
term has a complex history of its own. Bette Denich, in her analysis of 
the historical roots of the recent conflict in Yugoslavia, notes the 
77. Id. (citing "First Interim Report," UN S/25274, para. 57). 
78. Final Report, supra note 66, at 33 para. 131. 
79. Final Report, supra note 66, at 36 para. 147. 
80. Id. 
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following earlier use: 
In the words of an U stasha official, spoken at the outset of the [ 1941-
42) massacres, 'This country can only be a Croatian country, and there 
is no method that we would hesitate to use in order to make it truly 
Croatian and cleanse it of Serbs, who have for centuries endangered us 
and who will endanger us again if they are given the opportunity.' 81 
Second, it is unclear to what extent it was only one group that at 
least for a time propagated the desire for a "greater" or homogenous 
national state. This point gets a little complicated, as the idea itself, 
regardless of the desire, was manipulated by all sides. Here's Susan 
Woodward on how the Serbs and Croats confused the issue, making it 
unclear, even to the majority of Bosnians, what the Bosnian Muslim 
leadership may have sought 
Thus, contrary to those who saw the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina as an 
extension of the Croat-Serb conflict, secessionist Serbs and Croats had 
a common interest in playing up the issue of religious identity in order 
to deny the veracity of President [Alija] Izetbegovic's commitment to 
a secular Bosnian state, and his claim to represent all Bosnians. 
Izetbegovic reflected this tension through a damaging inconsistency in 
speech and action. He and his SDA could never decide what 
constitutional arrangement would best serve the Muslim nation once 
Croatia declared independence-an alignment with the federal 
government in Belgrade, with Zagreb as an independent state and 
against Bosnian Serbs, or with Serbs in a downsized federal 
Y 1 . 82 ugos avia. 
The consequences of this inconsistency were keen: not only did the 
SDA give "varying impressions of the meaning of Bosnia itself," 
including the idea of a greater Muslim state, but this thereby "made 
consistent propaganda difficult, left those who identified themselves as 
Bosnians without a reliable protector, and allowed the international 
community to be inconsistent in its approach also. "83 
81. Bette Denich, Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist Ideologies and the Symbolic 
Revival of Genocide, 21 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 367, 375, (citing ALEKSA DJILAS, THE 
CONTESTED COUNTRY: YUGOSLAV UNITY AND COMMUNIST REVOLUTION 1919 - 1953, 119 
(1991). 
82. SUSAN L. WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION AFTER THE 
COLD WAR 301 ( 1995). 
83. Id. at 301 ("They also gave varying impressions of the meaning of Bosnia itself - as 
a former federal unit of Yugoslavia with a legitimate historical state legacy of its own; as a 
state of the Muslim nation; or as a convenience on the road to a larger Muslim unit to 
include areas such as the Sandzak in Serbia and Montenegro, which were numerically 
majority Muslim areas and one-time Ottoman provinces."). 
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Woodward goes on to explain how propaganda was deployed to 
further "military objectives," whereby the more successful the 
propaganda, the more successful the military campaign; the less 
successful, the more numerous the victim count. In the result, "Because 
the Bosnian government forces and the Muslim paramilitaries had to 
fight a war on two fronts, they would inevitably have more dead, 
injured, and displaced. As an indirect result of their larger numbers and 
as a direct result of Bosnian Serb and Croat policy, Muslim civilians 
were the most numerous victims of the war."84 This would seem at least 
to query the view of the experts at the Commission that only one side 
had a policy whereas the others had limited political obiectives, or 
indeed what the difference is between these two descriptives. 5 
Third, the conduct of the Croats in Krajina and in Bosnia-
Herzegovina seems to contradict the thesis that it is a one-against-
everyone-else conflict as a general rule. That there may be a group A 
and a non-A group in a specific region-Prijedor, Krajina-seems less 
significant, in the Commission's analysis, than the number and scope of 
violations as determinative of a policy with respect to the violations. 
Policy, again, seems tied to the idea of a one-against-everyone-else 
ethnic or religious conflict. That is, if the violations seem more 
pervasive for one group than for another, then the conclusion must be 
that the latter had a "limited political objective" as compared with the 
former, which had a "policy." Bolstering this argument is the view that 
if the "objective" is condemned by the government, it cannot be the 
government's policy. And since the Franjo Tudjman regime 
condemned the practice-which did not prevent it from conducting, late 
in the war, what some allege to have been the largest instance of ethnic 
cleansing-it is deemed a matter only of limited political objective.86 
84. Id. at 301-02 ("The consequence was that foreign reporters, official invest igations, 
politicians, and human rights organizations expressed outrage at the genocidal policy of the 
Bosnian Serbs (similar Bosnian Croat tactics were said to be in self-defense) and thus 
focused attention increasingly on the rights of Muslims, not Bosnians. Those who needed 
the greatest international support received ever less."). 
85. On the question of"policy," see also Charles Simic, Urifashionable Victims 19 
LONDON REvIEW OF BOOKS 15, July 31, 1997, at 13-14 ("Serbs have never had a clear-cut 
national programme. I'm 59 years old and have had innumerable political discussions with 
Serbs of every description, but the subject of Greater Serbia has never come up. We are 
more likely to make fun of our national pretensions .... [T]he idea of 'Greater Serbia' was a 
half-baked scam, 'Plan B' set out after Milo_evi_'s other schemes to extend his power over 
the rest of Yugoslavia had collapsed."). 
86. See, e.g., James Petras & Steve Vieux, Bosnia and the Revival of U.S. Hege many, 
NEW LEFT REvIEW, July-August 1996, at 3, 15 ("In this slaughterhouse the only moral issue 
for the media was Serbian atrocities against the Bosnian Muslims. No one would know 
from the nightly news or from the daily newspapers that Croatia ran brutal detention camps 
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In actual fact, then, it would appear that object and purpose do 
become important for the experts in determining the criminality of the 
perpetrator. But it would seem to be the legal perspective, as construed 
by the Commission, that determines the purpose, evidently according to 
the scope of the acts committed and with little resort to the perspectives 
or the felt needs (political objectives, policies) of the parties involved: 
how, for example, the Croatian government can support, through its 
"Croatian Defence Council, police, armed civilians and local special 
forces," the practice of ethnic cleansing, how the practice is related to or 
evidence of a political purpose, and yet not be deemed government 
"policy," is unclear. 
Thus, according to the experts' analysis, the law's evolving, fluid 
nature involves containment: the tensions, contradictions and sheer 
messiness of internecine war are suppressed under a more streamlined 
and symmetrical view of conflict as defined by the Convention. The 
particular agency, or the rage and passion of the belligerents, gives way 
to precision and distance. On the one hand, it may be said that one 
motive engendering the need to square the conflict in Bosnia and 
Croatia with the definition of genocide may be the shock and horror of 
such massive violence and the evident ferocity amongst the 
belligerents.87 Genocide, if one presupposes the aforementioned link to 
the Holocaust and the "ultimacy" of the crime, would then be the most 
appropriate vehicle for expressing one's moral outrage and horror of the 
events in the present instance. On the other hand, the Commissioners 
may, in 1993 in the midst of the conflict, have felt a need to draw the 
world's attention to the victimization in Bosnia. Such a political 
deployment of the term would only work if the term resided within the 
popular imagination as a particularly egregious crime. Both motives, 
emotive and political, nevertheless have the effect of catering not to the 
particularity of the events under observation but rather to a kind of 
resurrection, or analepsis. The legal analysis is characterized by a 
strategy of elision, and we are invited to see the conflict, to "remember" 
or that it planned and carried out the largest single episode of ethnic cleansing in the war. 
Such facts were inconvenient for the U.S. government's justification of its own policy and 
therefore ignored. Once again the mass media convinced the bulk of liberal and progressive 
opinion-makers that U.S. intervention was needed for a high moral purpose."). 
87. Genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina Hearings before the U.S. Congressional 
Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 104 Cong. l st Sess., (April 4, 1995) 
(statement of Cherif Bassiouni, Chairman, United Nations Commission of Experts to 
Investigate Violations in the Former Yugoslavia) ("[A]bove all, the ferocity with which 
harm was inflicted is particularly shocking ... not only the physical, but the psychological 
consequences of their victimization. As I stated earlier, it is the ferocity of the victimization 
that is particularly shocking."). 
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it, as paradigmatic, as something other than it is. 
I do not mean to suggest that the only conflict that would fit the 
definition of genocide must needs resemble either the symmetry, if there 
ever were such a thing (see the Alstotter case), or the magnitude of the 
Holocaust. Indeed, in both of these stories, complexity gave way to the 
simple, dichotomized and non-coeval distance between subject and 
object. Nor do I believe that it should be impossible for a legal analysis 
to provide a complicated and "thick" description of an event, without 
resorting to a "moral equivalence" between the parties.88 What I do 
suggest is that if these two cases are any measure of how mass human 
rights violations are addressed under the law, then both exhibit a 
tendency toward a normative disaggregation between subject and 
object, between observer and observed. Notwithstanding the need to 
identify and punish the perpetrators of violent crimes, this 
disaggregation, I maintain, is at odds with an aspirational adherence to 
the rubric of equal rights for all or, put another way, to the rule of law as 
the rational essence of the human rights discourse, and as the claim to 
universality on that basis. 
VI. CONCLUSION: SACRALITY, Loss, AND MOURNING. 
If the rule of law is historical, then the interpretation and projection 
of the Holocaust, within the normative framework of the human rights 
discourse as trans-historical, is a repudiation of the rationality of the 
law. In this context, to project is to disown. But this is precisely a 
consequence of the sacralization of the Holocaust within the discourse 
of human rights: that is, by constructing the Holocaust as the 
foundational image, or founding imaginary, of the human rights 
discourse, the discourse reverts, from its legal-rational principles, to a 
more sacred or ultimate temporality. Ultimacy as the measure of 
experience bars us from seeing the event as historical and relational, and 
from seeing ourselves as juridical subjects situated within, and 
implicated by, that history. 
What is the alternative? It has been suggested here that one view, 
notwithstanding the initial discomposure of settled perceptions of good 
and evil, is to relativize or, put another way, to view genocidal conflict 
88. See, e.g., Final Report, supra note 66, at 52 para. 277 (For no reason that I can 
ascertain, the report notes that the Muslim detention centers are equally violative of 
international law but, unlike their more famous Serbian counterparts, characterizes them as 
"individual violations." Id. In the same vein, the Commissioners note, in reference to the 
Bosnian Muslim practice of ethnic cleansing, that quantitatively and, therefore qualitatively, 
"there is no factual basis for arguing that there is a 'moral equivalence' between the warring 
factions." Id. at 36-37, para. 148-149). 
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as complexly and obdurately historical. Relativizing experience is 
always contextual, however. Novick reminds us that when the Germans 
attempted to pass a law in the 1980s against denying the Holocaust, the 
price for supporting it was to include a provision making it illegal to 
deny the suffering of Germans expelled from the East after 1945. "In 
this context - and context, as always, is decisive-'relativization' meant 
equating crimes against Germans to crimes by Germans. Which, of 
course, many Germans wished to do."89 Germans who posited the 
uniqueness of the Holocaust attempted, in this context, to block the 
evasion of a confrontation "with a painful national past."90 The same 
posit of ultimacy and incomparability within the US "performs the 
opposite function: it promotes evasion of moral and historical 
responsibility. The repeated assertion that whatever the United States 
has done to blacks, Native Americans, Vietnamese, or others pales in 
comparison to the Holocaust is true-and evasive."91 
Not all events are posited against the Holocaust, to be sure, but this 
essay has argued that situating the sacral image of the Holocaust at the 
center of the discourse, as the legitimating rational/juridical exegesis of 
universalizability, has consequences for how we see events over time. I 
have suggested that this fixation of the sacral creates the new, post-
rationalist ethics of the discourse that rejects legal-rational analysis in 
its refusal of experience under the category of evil, or sin. As such, 
witnessing any other mass human rights atrocity-Kosovo comes to 
mind, as well as 9/11-creates a sense of shock and surprise, as if our 
own actions abroad have no political consequences.92 Consider also the 
suggestion that the Milosevi_ trial is about "the worst human rights 
violation since World War II": such a rhetoric not only diminishes other 
atrocities, it also evades our own complicity in the fall of Yugoslavia. 
How we see and remember mass human rights violations situates 
us within the world in certain ways. I do not propose an antidote to 
sacralization. On the contrary, sacralism is itself not only not the issue 
as such, but is also quite likely the most inevitable response to large-
scale traumatic events, a natural element of the mourning process.93 
89. NOVICK, supra note 36, at 14 (emphasis in original). 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 15 (emphasis in original). 
92. See, e.g., Mark Taylor, The World Trade Center Proposals: Beyond Mour ning, 
Building Hope on Ground Zero, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2002, at 40 ("This ground was not 
only haunted; it was also sacred."). 
93. Sacralism as part of the mourning process posits the ineffability of the event. See, 
e.g., id. at 40 ("It is necessary to find ways to remember, memorialize and mourn without 
becoming obsessed with a past we will never understand) (emphasis added). 
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Sacralism is, however, a largely emotional response to events. To the 
extent that the juridical apprehension of the event is determined by the 
elements of sacralism (the sacral object displaces the rational subject), 
the event is seen not as history but as archetype, a morality play (or 
Trauerspiel) without moral agents. My attempt here has been to 
reframe our experience of mass violence, to resituate it within a rational 
apprehension of the subject/self. We on this side of the border of 
innocence, and they on the other, are equally enraged, equally invested 
in the outcome of the political and aporetic struggle for human rights. 
Once the event is characterized as ultimate, and therefore universally 
determinate, we have nothing more to say. 
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